Glaxo’s Seroxat Study 329 Revisited?: Another Excellent Blog Post By Dr David Healy

…”When trials run on our children lead to representations that paroxetine is effective and safe even though the actual data shows exactly the opposite – it’s time to intervene.”…

Magna Carta

June, 8, 2015 | 24 Comments


  1. Hebeejeebee

    True and Sara Bloom and her cronies let this pass ..a 54 million dollar civil fine.Paxil did 3 billion dollars in the year I filed my lawsuit against GSK. They claimed a huge victory. .sickening.
    No real punishment. .NOBODY goes to prison. I TOOK this to the highest authority at GSK before I filed suit. It took THE US GOVERNMENT 9 years to screw up my case. I was a vast conspiracy under the watch of Eric Holder a former attorney for the company. 9 drugs not just paroxitene.
    Someone contact me through Truth man on this blog. They need to be held accountable for these atrocities and my story is in unbelievable.

  2. Pharmagreed

    I would like to know more.. I know Greg Thorpe was the only whistleblower who went to the company in hopes of changing things…so this must be him.
    There were others in the suit..basically hangers on fired from the company for doing what Greg reported. One was Blake Homdick (sp.?) or something like that. Greg brought him on due to some legal error with a former attorney. Anyway thanks to Greg for doing what 9000 other reps would not do. This includes Blake who lost a case for retaliation because he was an alcoholic, and disabled from childhood psychological issues. He threatened to kill Witty U think and others. Anyway Greg is the only one that mattered in the case. Can the moderator get him with me? I have seen Blake all over the Internet and he seems incoherent and repetitive..seemingly pretending to be Greg. I have read the Judges opinion of Blake H. and he was lucky Greg let him get paid, let alone half the case. He also quit sometime in the middle of the case so this must be Greg Thorpe a true hero for patients not an imposter with only dollars on his mind…like the guy he was told to hire Blake H…or something like that. Does not matter. Greg was the real deal. I need to contact him. I have seen the lame, rambling stuff from Blake, you can see he is lying…if you watch his eyes,constantly repeating himself. My take for what it is worth. Greg would and could tell the whole story about US, and justice. His”partner” is afraid I guess.
    Thanks I’d you can get me in touch with Greg. Only one seemingly without a personal agenda, who never quit.

    • truthman30

      Hi there Pharmagreed.
      I think you might be referring to the following (publicly available) document?


      CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-10641-RWZ
      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. Gregory Thorpe, et al.
      March 6, 2015
      ZOBEL, D.J.
      Plaintiff Blair Hamrick brought this suit under the anti-retaliation provision of the
      False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), for his termination from employment at
      the defendant GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”). GSK has moved for summary judgment.
      I. Background
      Plaintiff spills much ink recounting his long and difficult history at the company,
      including various perceived and actual slights and mistreatment, all of which is
      irrelevant to the present cause of action. The essential facts for this opinion follow,
      taken from the undisputed record.
      Blair Hamrick began work at GSK as a pharmaceutical sales representative in
      Colorado in 1997. On January 30, 2002, plaintiff met with a GSK Compliance Officer to
      discuss plaintiff’s allegations regarding off-label drug presentations sponsored by GSK.
      Case 1:03-cv-10641-RWZ Document 197 Filed 03/06/15 Page 1 of 8
      On October 19, 2003, Hamrick was cited for driving under the influence of
      alcohol (“DUI”). On October 24, 2003, he voluntarily took a medical leave of absence
      because of anxiety and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. On January 22,
      2004, Hamrick pled guilty to driving while alcohol impaired (“DWAI”) in connection with
      the October 2003 DUI citation.
      Plaintiff returned to work on January 27, 2004, in his then current position as
      Senior Executive Sales Representative. On January 29, he had a call with Gail
      Fletcher and Claudia Pattison, managers in the Human Resources Department (“HR”),
      concerning his allegations of off-label drug presentations. On February 12, he met with
      Pattison to continue discussing his concerns regarding off-label drug presentations.
      During the February 12, 2004, meeting with Pattison, plaintiff expressed anger
      towards his co-worker Peter Copeland, saying that he “would never do this, but …
      [Peter] is lucky I don’t rip his trachea out of his throat.” Pattison was particularly
      concerned about this violent ideation, as she was aware Hamrick in fact carried a gun.
      On March 16, 2004, Hamrick attended a GSK conference in Dallas, Texas.
      During the conference, while under the influence of prescription anti-anxiety
      medications and alcohol, he made several threats of violence against GSK managers.
      Three GSK employees reported plaintiff stating, and plaintiff does not dispute stating,
      the following:
      • “I hate this company. I’ve hated it since the merger. I’d like to take a gun
      and shoot some people.”

      • “[I]f there’s one thing I need from a 30-day psych leave, it’s another leave.
      Case 1:03-cv-10641-RWZ Document 197 Filed 03/06/15 Page 2 of 8
      You don’t understand, I’m obsessed with these thoughts. Let me give you
      an example. I’ve been having these dreams where I am in a wrestling
      match with Jerry [Nelson] and Pat [Keith] and I hit Jerry in the eye and his
      eye pops out and I hit Pat and crush his windpipe.”

      • “I’d like to kill [Jerry Nelson]. No, I wouldn’t have any remorse
      whatsoever. I’d like to kill him.”

      • “I want to kill that fucker [Pat Keith].”

      • Hamrick was also reported to have said he was having dreams of
      jamming his thumbs into Pat Keith’s eyes and ripping the eyeballs out.
      GSK’s “Violence-Free Workplace Policy” states that
      “[a]ny person who threatens, [or] exhibits threatening behavior … on [GSK]
      property or at [Gsk] sponsored events will be removed from the premises
      immediately, and will remain off premises pending the outcome of an
      investigation. A timely investigation will be made concerning the allegations.
      Should the investigation substantiate that violations of this policy have ocurred,
      [GSK] will initiate a decisive and appropriate response.”
      Pursuant to that policy, Hamrick was immediately placed on administrative leave with
      pay pending an investigation into his statements in Dallas.
      During this administrative leave, GSK became aware of Hamrick’s DUI citation
      and DWAI conviction through its annual motor vehicle record check of those who, like
      Hamrick, possessed company-owned vehicles. He had not reported either occurrence
      to GSK, in violation of company policy.
      In light of the reason for Hamrick’s leave, GSK requested he undergo a fitness
      for duty (“FFD”) evaluation on April 2, 2014, with an understanding by Hamrick that
      refusal to undergo the FFD would be grounds for termination. In response to this
      request, Hamrick provided a letter from his own psychiatrist, Dr. Crandall, stating her
      Case 1:03-cv-10641-RWZ Document 197 Filed 03/06/15 Page 3 of 8
      opinion that Hamrick is capable of performing his job responsibilities at GSK. Doctor
      Crandall had not evaluated Hamrick since his violent threats.
      On April 19, plaintiff sent GSK a request for severance. On June 2, GSK
      responded with a counter-offer, and on June 6, plaintiff rejected the counter-offer and
      stated that he no longer wished to resign.
      GSK’s then Director of HR, Bill Reedy, scheduled a meeting with Hamrick on
      June 23 to discuss Hamrick’s allegations about off-label marketing and his violations of
      policy (his driving offense and his threats of violence). Hamrick was informed that, per
      company policy, he could be accompanied by his attorney when GSK’s attorneys were
      present during the meeting, but not during the HR portion of the meeting when no GSK
      attorneys would be present, which would cover his conduct issues.
      On June 22, Hamrick’s attorney, Keith Cross, informed Mr. Reedy that Hamrick
      would not meet with GSK without his attorney present. Due to this refusal, the meeting
      was cancelled. On September 1, GSK’s outside counsel, Geoffrey Hobart, sent Cross
      a letter concerning Hamrick’s refusal to meet with GSK, and explained that Hamrick
      was bound by GSK’s Code of Conduct, and that “failure to fully cooperate with an
      investigation of an incident that occurs in the workplace” would be a further violation of
      company policy, potentially subjecting Mr. Hamrick to termination.
      There followed a series of communications between counsel for the parties. On
      September 3, Cross responded, setting multiple conditions and terms of any meeting
      between Hamrick and GSK. On September 20, Hobart reiterated the company’s
      request for an investigatory meeting and again stated that Cross could attend the
      Case 1:03-cv-10641-RWZ Document 197 Filed 03/06/15 Page 4 of 8
      portions of the meeting regarding off-label marketing but not those portions solely
      concerning the HR investigation of Hamrick’s threats and unreported driving infraction.
      On September 24, Cross informed Hobart that plaintiff would not meet with GSK. On
      October 13, GSK informed Hamrick, through his attorney, that he had been terminated
      due to his threatening and violent statements regarding GSK employees, his failure to
      report his DUI citation and DWAI conviction, and his refusal to cooperate with GSK’s
      II. Standard of Review
      Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows that there is no
      genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
      law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering whether or not a genuine issue of material
      fact exists, the court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing
      party.” Tolan v. Cotton,134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). Only if “a reasonable jury,
      drawing favorable inferences, could resolve [the motion] in favor of the nonmoving
      party” is the dispute genuine. See Travers v. Flight Sers. & Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 144,
      146 (1st Cir. 2013).
      III. Analysis
      The burden in this case is on the plaintiff to show (i) that he was engaged in
      conduct protected under the FCA; (ii) the employer had knowledge of this conduct; and
      (iii) the employer retaliated against the employee because of this conduct.” Harrington
      v. Aggregate Indus. Ne. Region, Inc., 668 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2012). Once this prima
      facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-
      Case 1:03-cv-10641-RWZ Document 197 Filed 03/06/15 Page 5 of 8
      retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. When the employer provides
      such a reason, it is the plaintiff’s burden to raise a jury question as to whether the
      reason provided is merely “a pretext calculated to mask retaliation.” Id.
      The standard for this case is laid out in the First Circuit’s decision in Travers v.
      Flight Services & Systems, Inc., 737 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2013). In Travers, the First
      Circuit reversed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an employment retaliation
      “[T]he applicable standard requires “but-for” causation. … [Plaintiff]’s
      claim would fail if [defendant] would have fired him absent retaliatory
      animus. And [defendant] also correctly reasons that the evidence here
      would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that [defendant] would have
      fired [plaintiff] … even if he had never [engaged in protected activity]. On
      … summary judgment … , however, the question is not whether a
      reasonable jury could find that [defendant] would have fired
      [plaintiff] even in the absence of retaliatory intent. Rather, the
      question pertinent to our review of summary judgment is whether no
      reasonable jury could find otherwise.”
      Travers, 737 F.3d at 148 (emphasis added).
      There is no dispute that Hamrick was engaged in protected activity and that GSK
      was aware of that activity from as early as 2002. The decision to terminate Hamrick
      came only shortly after implicit confirmation to GSK that he was, in fact, a qui tam
      relator. This temporal proximity is, perhaps, sufficient to give an inference of animus,
      so I assume, without deciding, that plaintiff’s prima facie burden was met.
      Defendant provides a substantial non-retaliatory basis for its decision to
      terminate Hamrick, linked to three main things. First, the company cites Hamrick’s
      erratic behavior and verbal threats made before and during a company retreat in March
      Case 1:03-cv-10641-RWZ Document 197 Filed 03/06/15 Page 6 of 8
      2004. Second, it points out Hamrick’s failure to disclose to the company his conviction
      of DWAI, in contravention of company policy requiring its disclosure. Third, GSK notes
      that company policy requires the termination of employees who refuse to cooperate
      with internal investigations, and defendant’s refusal to fully comply with GSK’s
      investigation into his erratic behavior and fitness for duty, by setting conditions to his
      meeting with the company. These events, taken together, are more than enough to
      shift the burden back to plaintiff.
      The remaining question is whether plaintiff can point to sufficient evidence to
      allow a reasonable jury to find that, but for his protected whistleblowing activity, he
      would not have been terminated. Plaintiff is right that he may, to some extent, rely on
      timing-driven inference to make out his case for retaliation to a jury. See Harrington,
      668 F.3d at 33 (the “sequence of occurrences leading up to a challenged decision, and
      close temporal proximity between relevant events” can “give rise to an inference of
      pretext.”). However, other than a generic pattern of alleged mistreatment, going back
      several years and attributable to many causes unrelated to his protected activity,
      plaintiff has produced no evidence whatsoever, other than the loose temporal
      inference, to support his allegation of retaliatory firing. In the face of the overwhelming
      and largely undisputed evidence of defendant’s serious misconduct immediately
      preceding the termination of his employment, he has failed to produce any evidence to
      create a genuine issue of material fact, i.e., to provide a basis for a reasonable jury to
      conclude that, but for his whistleblowing, he would not have been terminated.
      IV. Conclusion
      Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED.
      Judgment may be entered for the defendant.
      Case 1:03-cv-10641-RWZ Document 197 Filed 03/06/15 Page 7 of 8
      March 6, 2015 /s/Rya W. Zobel
      Case 1:03-cv-10641-RWZ Document 197 Filed 03/06/15 Page 8 of 8

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